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(1) a. It ain't no cat can't get into no coop. (Labov 1972:773) (= standard Eng. 'No cat can get into any coop') b. I can't get no satisfaction. (Jagger & Richards 1965) As the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/(I_Can't_Get_No)_Satisfaction wiki-entry on the Rolling Stones' rock anthem notes, "The title line is an example of a double negative resolving to a negative, a common usage in colloquial English." The cross-linguistic distribution of negative concord (NC) constructions has received a good deal of attention in recent work, much of it devoted to the relation of NC to negative polarity, the interpretive status of N-WORDS (indefinites with negative force, e.g. nessuno 'nobody' and niente 'nothing' in Italian) and the Such cases, variously termed pleonastic, expletive, or-in Smyth (1920) 's evocative term-sympathetic negation, are often attributed to the mental fusion or blend of two propositions, a positive clause in the scope of higher negation (hypotaxis) and a clause whose negative import is directly signaled (parataxis). This construction, frequent in Old English in which such verbs as tweo-'doubt', forebead-, forber-, geswic-'stop', and wiðcweð-'refuse' all govern paratactic or pleonastic negation (PN), persists into Middle English and Early Modern English:
(2) a. Nature defendeth and forbedeth that no man make himself riche.
[Chaucer]
b. First he denied you had in him no [= any] right. [Shakespeare, Com. Errors] c. You may deny that you were not [= that you were] the mean of my Lord Hastings late imprisonment. [Shakespeare, Richard III] Romance languages typically allow or require PN after verbs of fearing or forbidding, certain inherently negative adverbs (= 'unless', 'before', 'since', 'without'), and comparatives. In French, embedded clauses with (optional) pleonastic ne are distinct from those with full sentential negation with ne…pas:
a. Je crains qu'il ne vienne. 'I'm afraid he's coming' (cf. Je crains qu'il ne vienne pas. 'I'm afraid he's not coming ') b. avant/à moins qu'il ne vienne 'before/unless he comes' c. plus que je ne pensais 'more than I thought' d. depuis que je ne t'ai vu 'since I've seen you'
In his classic study of "négation abusive," Vendryes (1950:1) rejects the more standard label of "négation explétive" for such cases on the grounds that these negations are not grammatically on all fours with, say, the expletive dative pronoun in Prends moi ça 'Take that for me', which he sees as extrinsic to the primary assertion; such a sentence telescopes the two distinct clauses 'Take that' + 'you will give me pleasure'. The negation in (3), on the other hand, is an inherent part of the expression, extending from its own domain into that of its neighbor (i.e. the embedded clause). While his label will not be adopted here (given the rather prescriptive import of abusive in English), Vendryes offers a useful catalogue of "abusive" pleonastic negation in a range of languages (Sanskrit, Ancient Greek, Latin, German, Baltic, Slavic, Amharic). His exposition of the logic of the relevant constructions recapitulates Jespersen and Benveniste: X is Aer than Y = 'X is A to an extent that Y is not', unless = 'if not', before = 'when still not', and so on. Typically, a main clause governing PN will imply the nonaccomplishment, falsity, or undesirability of the embedded clause. 3 In addition to the contexts surveyed above, we find expletive negatives in other environments, including concessive (un) Similarly, PN appears in main clause exclamatives and interrogatives in a variety of languages, as in the Paduan examples of (5) from Portner and Zanuttini (2000) and their now somewhat quaint English counterparts as in (6a), cited by Jespersen. Along the same lines, we can still find the upper register pleonastic negation in embedded modal contexts like (6b) in the upper literary register. In the examples of (3) and (6), the use of "sympathetic" negation tends to correlate with higher registers, whence the somewhat formal or archaizing feel of such turns. On the other hand, sympathetic negation is alive and well in colloquial speech, to the consternation of authorities like Fowler (1926:383-4) , who disparages a negative "evoked in a subordinate clause as a mere unmeaning echo of an actual or virtual negative in the main clause" as "wrong and often destructive of the sense." Alas, he concedes, "We all know people who habitually say I shouldn't wonder if it didn't turn to snow when they mean if it turned." Thus too: (7) a. Don't be surprised if it doesn't rain. [standard weather warning] b. I won't be shocked if every single game is not a sellout.
[radio sports talk host Craig Carton, predicting that fans will fill Yankee Stadium during its last year of operation in 2008] c. I would not be surprised if his doctoral dissertation committee is not composed of members from several departments within a university. On that far from infrequent miss not turn in (8d), Lederer (2008) sniffs:
Let's look at a number of familiar English words and phrases that turn out to mean the opposite or something very different from what we think they mean: I really miss not seeing you. Whenever people say this to me, I feel like responding, "All right, I'll leave!"
Here speakers throw in a gratuitous negative, not, even though I really miss seeing you is what they want to say.
In fact, a Jespersen-style fusion or parataxis analysis is eminently plausible here: (8d) = 'I miss seeing you' + 'I regret not seeing you'. Despite its "gratuitous" nature, the truth-conditionally pleonastic negative is not without its grammatical effect, in that the weakly negative miss cannot license NPIs without its help: The hackles of prescriptivists, if elevated by the pleonastic negatives of (7) and (8), are raised to the rafters by the tendency of speakers and writers to lose track of the number of negations in a sentence. If Duplex negatio affirmat, we would predict that Triplex negatio negat, and indeed we do find instances in which three semantically autonomous negatives yield the force of one negation:
(11) a. The Mets did not not re-sign Mike Hampton because they didn't want to pay him the money.
(= It wasn't because they didn't want to pay him that they didn't re-sign him.) [Suzyn Waldman, WFAN sports radio host, 10 May 2001] b. Even Susan Sontag, a former PEN president, who supports the leadership against Ms. Komisar,…hesitated when asked about Mr. Ovitz's role. "I'm not saying I'm not unhappy," she said, but added that quibbles might be "frivolous." [NYT, 12 March 1997] But given the conceptual markedness of even simple negation and its concomitant difficulty for the language processor, as verified in extensive empirical studies by Clark, Wason, and others (see Horn 1989: Chapter 3 for an overview), the interaction of the three negations is more accurately characterized as Triplex negatio confundit. The tendency for a triple negation to convey a positive is especially prevalent when at least one of the negatives is incorporated into an adverb like too or beyond or as expressed in an inherently negative predicate like surprised, avoid, deny, or doubt, as seen in the examples below (cf. also the links at Liberman 2004 and Whitman 2007) . In these cases, the reinforcing ("illogical") double negation cancels out an ordinary negation, effectively yielding a positive; alternately, one negation can be viewed as pleonastic.
(12) a. "I would not ever want to say that there are not people on our campus that at first are not hard to understand, at least until students get used to them."
b. "There isn't a man there who doesn't think they can't do it."
[Radio commentator Suzyn Waldman on Yankees' confidence, 2 Oct. 2000] c. "I would not ever want to say that there are not people on our campus that at first are not hard to understand, at least until students get used to them," Watkins said.
[ It is not for nothing that Hodgson (1885:218) observes that "Piled-up negatives prove easy stumbling-blocks", 5 while Fowler (1926:375) less genially concedes that "Blunders with negatives are extremely frequent." But while, as Vendryes (1950:15) puts it, "il est naturel que les purists la [= PN] proscrivent au nom de la logique," we can nevertheless understand the motivation for the retention of "grammatical" PN in some languages and the periodic eruption of "ungrammatical" PN weeds in linguistic gardens elsewhere.
This emerges from the distribution of another variety of apparently redundant negation that Jespersen (1917:72-3; 1924:334) dubs RESUMPTIVE negation:
[A]fter a negative sentence has been completed, something is added in a negative form with the obvious result that the negative effect is heightened…[T]he supplementary negative is added outside the frame of the first sentence, generally as an afterthought, as in "I shall never do it, not under any circumstances, no on any condition, neither at home nor abroad", etc.
In fact, the supplementary negation can precede rather than follow the main clause. Examples of both types abound in both literary and colloquial language:
(13) a. He cannot sleep, not even after taking an opiate. [Jespersen] b. Not a creature was stirring, not even a mouse. [cf. Lawler 1974] Recent discussions of this phenomenon include those of Lawler (1974) , van der Wouden (1997) , and especially Dowty (2006) , who persuasively makes the case for the original clause and "afterthought" as constituting separate assertions:
Resumptive Negation is an elliptical form of assertion revision: that is, it indicates a new assertion which is intended to replace the assertion made in the core clause; it may be either a strengthening or a weakening of the original assertion…Neither negation is in the scope of the other, nor is one of the negations merely pleonastic. (Dowty 2006:5-6) A related construction is that of negative parentheticals, in which negation can appear pleonastically within a parenthetical based on one of a range of neg-raising propositional attitude predicates (believe, suppose, imagine) following the expression of main clause negation (cf. Horn 1978:190ff.) : 5 Such stumbling blocks don't stop at the courthouse door. In an Alabama case from 1912 recounted by Bryant (1930: 264) , Aletha Allen, a 80-year-old deaf woman, was killed by a train after having been warned not to go onto the track. When her estate sued the railway company involved, the jury acquitted the defendant, but a new trial was granted on the grounds that the jurors had been instructed to find for the defendant unless the evidence showed that the engineer did not discover the peril of the woman in time to avoid injury. The higher court invoked Triplex Negatio Confundit, ruling that both the original charge to the jury and its interpretation by the jurors was based on what was meant, not what was said. (Cf. Horn 1991 for further details.) (14) a. The Republicans aren't, I (don't) think, going to support the bill.
b. The Republicans, I (*don't) think, aren't going to support the bill.
The crusaders curiously seem inclined to take both the resumptive and parenthetical negatives of (13) and (14a) in stride. Indeed, Jespersen (1924:333-4) invokes the tacit tolerance of prescriptivists toward resumptive negation in his defense of negative concord against the standard charge of faulty logic:
No one objects from a logical point of view to "I shall never consent, not under any circumstances, neither at home nor abroad"; it is true that here pauses, which in writing are marked by commas, separate the negatives, as if they belonged to so many different sentences, while in "he never said nothing"…the negatives belong to the same sentence. But it is perfectly impossible to draw a line between what constitutes one, and what constitutes two sentences; does a sentence like "I cannot goe no further" (Shakespeare) become more logical by the mere addition of a comma: "I cannot goe, no further"?
Jespersen's quotation in this passage refers to a scene in the very same Forest of Arden that serves as a locus classicus for exhibiting the relatively free variation often attested in the distribution of hyper-and standard negation:
(15) a. CELIA. I pray you, bear with me. I cannot go no further. Relatedly, code-switching between variants is not uncommon, as when the now defunct electronics chain "The Wiz" promulgated its commercial jingle "Nobody beats the Wiz/Ain't nobody gonna beat the Wiz," presumably to capture the full range of potential consumers. Another illustration is Dylan's celebrated apothegm with its hide-and-seek NC. Pinker (2009) has recently lambasted the legal opinions of Chief Justice John Roberts for having "altered quotations to conform to his notions of grammaticality, as when he excised the 'ain't' from Bob Dylan's line 'When you ain't got nothing, you got nothing to lose'." But in the version of "Like a Rolling Stone" published in The Definitive Dylan Songbook (Dylan 2001) , the original version of the line appears as "When you got nothing, you got nothing to lose." Perhaps it's not a matter of Justice Roberts removing NC to meet his strictures of properness as much as Mr. Zimmerman inserting NC to conform to metrical considerations and/or the perceived sociolinguistic expectations of his listeners. 6 As we have seen, both PN in general and NC in particular have long aroused the purist's wrath for the arrant violation of Duplex negatio affirmat. For the linguist, negative concord-as it name suggests-is essentially no more illogical than subject-verb agreement or vowel harmony, a spreading of the negative force of a statement to indefinites within the same clause. But what of other varieties of pleonastic negation, which do not instantiate concord and, as expletive elements, might be expected to be semantically empty? Extraneous (expletive) material that results in two diametrically opposed readings for an embedded clause would appear to violate both the "Avoid ambiguity" and "Be brief" submaxims of manner (or the Q and R principles that respectively subsume them; cf. Horn 1989), so why does it not just subsist but flourish?
Psychological explanations have been offered, from Damourette and Pichon (1928) on the motivation for PN in French to Wason and Reich (1979) on the pragmatic factors facilitating the plausible but wrong interpretation of statements like No head injury is too trivial to be ignored. We have seen that the use of PN may affect NPI licensing (recall (10) above) and may also raise or lower the register, as in modern French or colloquial English. But in addition, while not affecting truth conditions, PN is not always semantically and pragmatically inert. 7 For example, Zeijlstra (2008) observes that although standard Dutch is basically a double negation rather than NC language, it contains certain NP-internal constructions (e.g. niemand niet 'nobody not', nooit geen 'nothing no') that are understood as single but emphatic negations, rather than simply canceling out. He analyzes these as lexical items, not as true instances of NC.
In addition to such emphatic functions, PN may sometimes introduce presuppositions, although the data are subtle. In their influential paper on Italian comparatives, Napoli and Nespor (1976) explore the constraints on the use of what they term non 2 in comparatives and indirect questions as illustrated in (16): (16) a. Maria è piu intelligente di quanto {è/non sia} Carlo.
'Maria is more intelligent than Carlo is' b. Maria è piu intelligente di quanto tu {credi/non creda}.
'Maria is more intelligent than you believe' c. Chissà che {ti sposi/non ti sposi}.
'Who knows if {he'll/he might not} marry you'
In the first two pairs, the speaker of the latter variant-with PN and subjunctive mood-presupposes that her comparative contravenes a previously held belief, while in (16c), the PN version "is used when the speaker expects the negated proposition to surprise someone, or to be contrary to prior expectations" (Napoli and Nespor 1976:836) . Zanuttini (1997) offers a similar take on non V mica in Italian, while Schwenter (2005) argues that the relevant property for licensing secondary, non-canonical double sentential negation in Brazilian Portuguese is the discourse-old status of the proposition denied.
Other non-truth-conditional differences between unmarked and PN-bearing embedded clauses have been posited in various languages. Thus Espinal (1992 Espinal ( :336, 1997 points to minimal pairs in Catalan like (17) in which the speaker of (17a) regards the arrival as likely, while the speaker of (17b) is more neutral or doubtful about the occurrence of the event.
(17) a. Tinc por que arribaran tard.
'I'm afraid they will arrive late.' have fear that arrive+FUT late b. Tinc por que no arribin tard.
'I'm afraid they might arrive late.' arrive+SUBJ More controversially, Yoon (2008) has argued that in Japanese and Korean, PN under verbs of hoping as well as verbs of fearing is associated with speaker's assessment of uncertainty and/or undesirability, but her data have been challenged by other native speakers. To be sure, as pointed out by Vendryes (1950:5) , the specific conditions on the use of PN are subtle and hard to pin down. Given that a natural account of such conventional but non-truth-conditional components of speaker meaning would invoke Gricean conventional implicature, this result should not be surprising; cf. Potts (2007) and Horn (2008b) on the "descriptive ineffability" of conventional implicatures.
Besides conveying emphasis and introducing presuppositions, another function-or in any case, result-of hypernegation is to reinforce regional identity within a speech community. A shibboleth of New England speech is so don't I, or more generally so AUXn't NP. The most complete inventory for this "Massachusetts negative positive" (see 1999 cite below) is the draft entry for so that will appear in the Dictionary of American Regional English when the 4 th volume of DARE is published. 8
So adv chiefly N[ew]Eng[land]
In neg constr following positive constr: used to express agreement with the positive const-often in phr so don't I 'so do I'. 1962 NYT Book Rev. 28 Jan. 16/1, This expression [= 'don't be surprised if he doesn't visit you one of these days] is akin to the old jocular negative in the following piece of dialogue: "I wish I had an orange." "So don't I." Here again, the speaker means a strong "So do I." 1980 Daily Hampshire Gaz. 9 Sept 16/2, And just as the mood of the once-solemn convocation has changed over the past few years, so hasn't the opening address by President Jill Ker Conway.
1998 NADS Letters nwPA (as of c. 1980), The standard response indicating agreement was "so don't I" (as in A: "I like ice cream." B: "Mmmm. So don't I!" Also "so didn't I", "so doesn't she", etc.) 1999 DARE File-Internet [Boston Online The Wicked Good Guide to Boston English], So don't I-An example of the Massachusetts negative positive. Used like this: "I just love the food at Kelly's." "Oh, so don't I!" While this construction is frequently taken to be ironic (or "jocular"), both cites and speaker intuitions falsify this claim, as noted by John Lawler (p.c.) , who also points out its extension to pockets (like Illinois) far from its New England base. In recent unpublished work, Jim Wood uses elicited data to argue that so don't/can't NP cancels the exhaustiveness implicature of the corresponding affirmative.
Another question regarding this construction is whence. In recent work by Freeman (2004) and Pappas (2004) , so do not I and the like are tracked to Shakespeare (Twelfth Night, III.iv; Richard III, I.iv, II.ii) and Beaumont & Fletcher, with-so it is claimed-pleonastic (non-)force sometimes intended. But in fact these arguments are unconvincing. Even in the most favorable environment, the cite from Twelfth Night, Midland's negative-positive answer to so AUXn't NP is the regionally restricted reading of don't care to reflected in this entry from Montgomery (2004): care verb To be willing or agreeable to (usu. in phr. I don't care to, a response to a suggestion or invitation). The verb may range in sense from the understatement "not to mind if one does" or "to be pleased if one does." 1929 Chapman Mt Man 510 "I don't care for work" means "I like to work-I don't mind working." And "I'd not care to drive a car" means "I am not afraid to-I'd like to drive a car." Yet outlanders who have lived years in the mountains are still taking these comments in the modern sense, and advertising that the mountain man is lazy and that he is shy of modern invention. 1939 Hall Recording Speech 7 Examples of not to care to for not to mind, as in a sentence spoken by an Emerts Cove man, "She don't care to talk," meaning "She doesn't mind talking," are found in both the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 1998 Brewer Words of Past Another East Tennesseism is the practice, when asking somebody to do something, of adding "if you don't care to" when the meaning is exactly opposite of the plain English. An example would be, "Would you carry me to work, if you don't care to?"
In retrospect, this (non-)development should not be surprising; essentially, don't mind and don't care, compositionally equivalent, went their different ways for speakers of the standard dialect, just as horrific and terrific have become anto- Note in particular the 1611 cite, in which the complaisant trollop in question doesn't object in the least to furnishing her husband with metaphorical horns.
Another regional variant also largely localized to Midland U.S. English reflects not the negative positive but the jack-in-the-box "Positive Negative," as related in Frazier's (1997) missive from "Sure Don't America":
Normally the negative is expressed by the word "no". But for some people, and in some places, "no" is not part of the vocabulary. Instead speakers use an upbeat substitute that nevertheless conveys the same meaning-hence, the "Positive Negative". For example, if you go into a convenience store…and you ask the salesperson if they have any cat food, he or she will reply, cheerful as can be, "We sure don't!" The last word is spoken with rising inflection, as if the expression were a positive one ending with the word "do". Sometimes the word "sure" is accented with a regretful but still good-humored shake of the head…The Positive Negative can be adapted to any situation in which the answer is no: "Will you be back later?" "I sure won't!" "Can you give me a jump start?" "I sure can't".
Hypernegation proper extends from the syntactic cases we have surveyed here to lexical instances of the phenomenon. This catalogue can begin with double negative affixes with single negative meaning, as in the adjectival cases in which prefixal and suffixal negation do not cancel out. This occurred more productively in earlier (16 th and 17 th century) times, as seen in redundant formations like unmatchless ['unmatched', 'matchless'] , unguiltless, unhelpless, unmerciless and so on (OED un 1 , 5a; cf. also Horn 1988:224) , but survives in present-day irregardless or German unzweifellos 'doubtless', lit. 'undoubtless'.
While hypernegated adjectives are now marginal, their verbal counterparts, involving an un-/de-/dis-prefixed verb that reinforces rather than reverses the meaning of the stem, are robust. Standard examples include such (ir)reversatives as unthaw (= thaw, unfreeze), unloose(n) (= loose(n), untighten), unravel, dissever, and disannul and denominals like unpeel, unshell, unpit, deworm, debone. I have argued (Horn 1988, 2002b ) that these forms are motivated by the fact that un-verbs unambiguously signal a source-oriented reading in which the object or theme is returned to a state of nature (helping entropy along). A speaker may not know whether boning a chicken involves inserting or removing the bones or whether raveling the threads of a fabric entangles or disentangles them, but with deboning and unraveling only one meaning is possible. Ironically, this disambiguation function of redundant affixation has been compromised by technologi-cal advances; with the emergence of means to reverse deletions and erasures, previously entropic verbs like unerase, undelete, or unsort can now be interpreted compositionally, although the redundant readings are still attested.
We now turn to HYPONEGATION, in which there are more (rather than fewer) negatives available for interpretation than are actually expressed. Remaining within the lexical domain, consider the haplology of unpacked, as seen in (19): (19) (Horn 1988, fn. 17) . Similarly, the potential threat posed by the Giants' (then) newly obtained star receiver in (19 ) remained un-unveiled due to his injuries.
(19 ) [Because of Plaxico Burress's injuries] The big-play threat the Giants hoped he would provide Eli Manning remains unveiled. [NYT 5 Aug. 2005, D1] A rich crosslinguistic vein for mining both hypernegation (which doesn't count when it "should") and hyponegation (which counts when it "shouldn't") is that of the INVERSE READINGS of proximatives like almost and barely (Horn 2002a , Ziegeler 2006 , Amaral 2007 , where the same expression can yield either 'almost' or 'barely' (= 'almost not') interpretations, depending on the context: While the effect in (21 b) is hypernegation, that in (22b) is hyponegation, as it is in Swiss German, where fasch normally corresponds to Standard Ger. fast 'almost' but also allows an inverted 'barely' sense. In English too, we can use near miss in a similar Janus-faced way both for disasters just avoided and goals just attained, to the consternation of language maven William Safire, whose "On Language" column of 2 January 2005 assails the "nonsensical" use of near miss: "Some of us patiently but uselessly pointed out that the writer meant 'near hit'."
The most notorious instance of hyponegation in English is undoubtedly could care less 'couldn't care less', which dates back at least to Shirley Povich's comment in 1955 (written just before the Brooklyn Dodgers finally vanquished Stengel's Yankees in the World Series), "Casey Stengel could care less about the Dodgers' reputation for beating southpaws." I won't try to sort out the development here-sarcasm? frozen irony? reanalysis from an understood (or formerly understood) As if/Like I could care less? The sarcasm position is advocated by Pinker (1994:377) and rejected in Lawler (1974) and Liberman (2004) ; Liberman's Language Log post and links from it explore the intonational issue raised by Pinker as well as the formal and sociolinguistic distribution of the hyponegative.
The alternation between the equipollent variants I could care less and I couldn't care less is reminiscent of the class of SQUATITIVES (squat and its kin, including doodly-squat, diddly-shit, jack shit, zilch, beans, et al.) , a set of minimizers with peculiar properties explored in  where the sources for (23) and (24) are provided, along with related examples) and Postal (2004) ; see also Postma (2001) for a related class of drecative NPIs in Dutch. A licensed squatitive is essentially an NPI like anything or a damn thing:
(23) a. He then looked into a career as a newspaper reporter but discovered writing didn't pay squat. b. The designated hitter or DH: A player who is designated to bat for the pitcher, who, with rare exceptions, can't hit for squat. c. We're all professionals, we understand the season's over. We happened to be 15-3, that doesn't mean squat now.
Unlicensed squat is an n-word like nothing, nada, or niente:
(24) a. All the talk of a resurrected Yeomen football program the past two seasons will mean squat if the team fumbles its opportunity to make the playoffs. b. When the more sophisticated students complain that they are learning squat, I would direct the professor to remind them that tutoring builds the self-esteem of both tutor and tutee. c. My dad got'em [football tickets] for free. He works at the university. They pay him squat so they give him perks.
A unified analysis of squatitives would either take the sentences in (23) to be hypernegations or take those in (24) to be hyponegations-but not both. In some varieties of English, one version or the other may predominate; Inspector Diamond in Peter Lovesey's mystery series is consistent in wielding his bugger alls, sod-alls, and sweet FAs as unlicensed squatitives only: (25) a. "What did they do about it? Bugger all?" "No. They showed some responsibility." b. "What is comes down to is the result that whatever the result it's bugger-all use without a hair from the suspect to match." c. "Two innocent people died for bugger all?" "I'm afraid that's true."
One possible approach to could care less (CCL) would treat it essentially as a squatitive, appearing as an NPI in the scope of negation or unlicensed bearing its own negative force. This would amount to pursuing the analogy in (26): (26) I couldn't care less : I could care less :: It's not worth squat : It's worth squat Postal (2004:361) collects squatitives and CCL under the same umbrella, and takes both CCL and its compositional counterpart couldn't care less to exclude negative polarity items from their scope; the judgments in (27) are Postal's.
(27) a. She could not (*at all/*ever) care (*at all) less about their/*anyone else's agenda) (*at all). b. She could care less about their/*anyone else's agenda) (*at all).
In fact, though, a quick googling disconfirms this claim. Among the >1000 Google hits for any, ever, or both in the scope of could/couldn't care less are:
(28) a. I couldn't care less about anyone or anything anymore.
b. These people clearly couldn't care less about anyone but themselves. c. I could care less about anyone else's sexual fantasy life d. I couldn't care less about ever going back to school. e. I could care less about ever having a No. 1 single f. EOM staffers could care less about ever again hearing anything about the Department of Justice's Executive Office for Immigration Review
While there are roughly twice as many hits for CCL than for its compositional counterpart, this is presumably an artifact of the current (web-attested) preference for the "illogical" formation in general. In any case, the evidence from both my own intuition and the Google hits is at odds with Postal's antipathy towards (any) NPI licensing by CCL or its negative counterpart, but consistent with his point that the presence or absence of overt negation is irrelevant. Similar remarks apply to another classic hyponegation with a more clearly sarcastic origin: That'll teach you to VP with the sense of 'that will teach you not to VP'. In Lawler 1974, the negative and hyponegative versions of this rebuke are not syntactically interchangeable, since the invisible negation in (29) The key factor here is that in the acceptable examples, the speaker's point is to assert or communicate the relevant negative proposition, which is not the case for (only-less) clefts or in-situ focus. NPIs are permitted if exhaustivity (and not just identity) is asserted, even if (as in (31) and (32)) it's not directly expressed.
While an invisible negative can license NPIs, the visible but non-functional negative of so don't I evidently cannot, as Jim Wood (p.c.) points out. As shown by examples drawn from both langue and parole, the appearance of a hypertrophic negative marker or the nonappearance of a functional one can be a poor guide to the syntactic and semantic polarity of the statement in which it occursor fails to occur. After all, negation is the un-wizzywig of grammatical categories, where all too often what you see is what you don't get-and vice versa. 9 
